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Abstract—We consider shared workspace scenarios with hu-
mans and robots acting to achieve independent goals, termed as
parallel play. We model these as general-sum games and construct
a framework that utilizes the Nash equilibrium solution concept
to consider the interactive effect of both agents while planning.
We find multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria in these tasks. We
hypothesize that people act by choosing an equilibrium based
on social norms and their personalities. To enable coordination,
we infer the equilibrium online using a probabilistic model that
includes these two factors and use it to select the robot’s action.
We apply our approach to a close-proximity pick-and-place task
involving a robot and a simulated human with three potential
behaviors - defensive, selfish, and norm-following. We showed
that using a Bayesian approach to infer the equilibrium enables
the robot to complete the task with less than half the number
of collisions while also reducing the task execution time as
compared to the best baseline. We also performed a study with
human participants interacting either with other humans or with
different robot agents and observed that our proposed approach
performs similar to human-human parallel play interactions. The
code is available at https://github.com/shray/bayes-nash
I. INTRODUCTION
People often perform activities in shared spaces with other
people achieving their own individual goals. This includes
driving to work while sharing the road with other cars, navi-
gating around other shoppers when pushing a cart in a grocery
store, and sharing counter-space and utensils in a kitchen.
Although, these situations are neither purely collaborative nor
competitive, however, the actions of other participants have
bearing on each person’s own success or failure. We refer
to these activities as parallel play, related to its psychology
namesake that refers to activities in early social development,
where children play besides instead of with, other children [20,
19]. In the Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) context, we define
parallel play to refer to those activities where people and
robots have separate individual goals but interact due to shared
space. We aim to derive a framework that helps a robot plan
effectively for parallel play with human participants, and apply
it to a close-proximity pick-and-place scenario between a robot
and a human.
Planning a robot’s action in HRI usually involves consid-
ering the robot’s goal as well as predictions of future human
actions [23, 1, 11]. When working with others, people are
often considerate of their intents and beliefs due to Theory-of-
Mind [21, 5], and so, the human’s action is influenced by their
predicted plans of the other participant’s, including the robot.
Modeling this cyclical-dependence, of the human’s predicted
plan on the robot’s and vice-versa, is important for accurately
representing the interaction dynamics in HRI.
Game Theory provides us tools to model this inter-
dependence of rational interacting agents. The Nash equi-
librium (NE) is a set of actions, one for each agent in the
game, which is optimal, assuming the actions of others remain
fixed [13]. A Nash equilibrium implicitly captures the inter-
dependence between agents, and our approach plans by finding
equilibria to enable better coordination.
Although humans have been shown to play to Nash equi-
librium [15], we find that multiple equilibria can exist in
a game and it is not clear how the robot should choose
between them. Figure 1 shows an example of two equilibria
in a pick-and-place scenario, where each favors a different
agent by allowing them to reach their goal first. A collision
is likely if both agents choose an equilibrium that favors
them, highlighting the importance of coordination. Humans
can coordinate social behavior in non-competitive games by
learning and following social norms [10]. Here, a norm refers
to a set of abstract instructions that agents follow, and expect
others to follow. In Figure 1, a norm might favor solutions
that allow the agent closer to their goal to reach for it first
and, if followed by both agents, would lead to coordination.
However, sometimes agents can ignore the norm in favor of
their personal preferences. For example, a selfish agent might
ignore the norm and expect the other to always yield to them
when reaching for an object. Coordinating with such agents
requires the ability to infer this preference from experience.
We design a framework that finds Nash equilibria for par-
allel play tasks; it models the strategy for choosing equilibria
as a distribution composed of two aspects - (1) a domain-
specific social norm, designed by an expert apriori and (2) an
agent-specific individual preference, inferred online during the
interaction. We hypothesize that this framework would lead to
better coordination with humans in performing in such tasks,
due to its modeling of the decision-making coupling between
agents, as well as, its combination of expert knowledge with
online adaptation. To validate, we apply this to a close-
proximity pick-and-place task, designed to be similar to HRI
tasks used to study team coordination and fluency [7, 16] with
a simulated human. Our results show that this framework is
able to shorten task execution time while also reducing the
number of human collisions by half as compared to the best
baseline when interacting with a simulated human with 3
potential personalities.
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(a) Nash Equilibirum (NE) Action Sequences
(b) Cost Matrix
Fig. 1. A scenario where two agents, P1 and P2, move the red and black blocks to their respective goal locations. In (a), we show two sequences of actions
starting in the same state at t0, and ending in the same goal state at tend. While each action sequence (trajectory) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE), they both favor
different agents. NE1 (top) favors P2 by allowing it to reach its goal first, NE2 (bottom) favors P1. A cost function is illustrated in (b), where each cell is a
tuple containing the cost of the actions for P1 and P2 respectively. Here, our action space has only 2 actions per agent, A1 = {a11, a21} and A2 = {a12, a22}.
We make the following contributions:
1) Introduce a novel framework that models norm-
following social behavior and personality-based likeli-
hood inference to interactive-planning with humans in
parallel play activities. We do this by first computing
the Nash equilibria and then using this framework to
find a distribution over them.
2) Design task and metrics to benchmark the performance
of interactive-planning algorithms for parallel play. This
includes 3 baselines for simulating distinct human per-
sonalities that have similarity to human performance
of the task, which enables testing adaptability of the
algorithms to different human behavior.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been extensive work in HRI for planning a robot
to work on tasks around humans in domains like parts assem-
bly [9, 7], motion planning, and autonomous driving [23, 1].
Planning around people generally involves two aspects, pre-
dicting the human’s behavior and finding robot actions that
achieve its goal in the presence of the human.
Human modeling. Prior work has placed emphasis on
accurately modeling the human’s rational goal-driven behavior.
This includes learning the human’s preferences to predict low-
level trajectories through a reward function obtained by inverse
reinforcement learning [29, 23] or high-level decision-making
and choice of goal or the timing of actions for part delivery
using a probabilistic task model [9, 8]. Some models were also
adaptable in modeling the preferences of the particular human
with whom the robot was interacting [17].
Human adaptive planning. A common approach to plan-
ning for this interactive setting is by predicting the human’s
behavior and then finding a best-response to this behavior.
This approach works very well in scenarios where the robot
assumes an assistive role like parts delivery [9, 28] where,
apart from ensuring that the human doesn’t wait, the robot
intends to avoid interactions by keeping out-of-the-way. It has
also been used to plan a robot to pick-up objects in a close-
proximity scenario where the robot planned trajectories that
did not intersect with predicted human plans [16, 14]. An
inherent assumption, here, is that, although the human’s plan
depends on the situation, the prediction is independent of the
robot’s plan. So, in situations where the agents have equal
roles, like driving or navigation, the robot will choose overly
conservative behaviors which can lead it to freeze when trying
to navigate crowds [26] or fail to merge in traffic [23].
Mutually adaptive planning. Recent work has addressed
this by considering the human’s influence-ability as well. Their
model includes both the influence of the human and their
goals on the robot and the influence of the robot on the
human. Similar to us, they also utilize game-theoretic tools
to model this cyclical influence. Turnwald and Wollherr [27]
modeled robot navigation as a dynamic general-sum game
and computed a Nash equilibrium to effectively plan the
robot’s trajectory among a crowd of pedestrians. Sadigh et al.
[23] modeled driving as a Stackelberg game where the robot
planned first and the human planned in response; they showed
that this model can successfully influence human behavior
in simulated driving tasks. Fisac et al. [6] extended this to
longer time horizons by computing a Nash equilibrium for
high-level actions and optimizing low-level trajectories for
executing them. Gabler et al. [7] utilized the Nash equilibrium
to find an order for object pick-up in a close-proximity pick-
and-place task similar to ours; they found that considering
the mutual adaptation allowed their framework to improve
safety as well as human subjective preference. Our approach
also uses the Nash equilibrium to plan goal-driven actions for
the robot that consider the mutual adaptability between the
two agents. However, our approach includes a strategy for
selecting an equilibrium in case multiple are present, while
others either have not mentioned this strategy [7] or only find
one equilibrium due to their problem structure [23, 6].
Online model inference. Although different people perform
the same task in different ways, prior work uses a single
model to describe all human users, with some exceptions.
While in [17], Nikolaidis et. al. cluster human behavior into
multiple types and predict actions based on the inferred type,
in [18], they group people by their adaptability to the robot’s
actions. Chen et al. [3] explicitly model human trust on the
robot’s ability during decision-making and infer this parameter
during the interaction. Sadigh et al. [22] use information-
gathering actions to infer whether a driver is attentive or not
and use this to coordinate better. We define a latent variable
that represents the human personality and infers this online,
for each participant, in order to find plans that coordinate well
with the human. Recently, Schwarting et al. [24] proposed
a method for simulated autonomous driving around human
drivers using Nash equilibrium. Similar to us, they have
a parameter that represents human-personality and infers it
online. However, in their model, this parameter is part of
the human cost function while we use it to choose between
Nash equilibria. Also, while they define a continuous action-
space and use a local approximation for computing Nash
equilibrium, which finds a single equilibrium, we find multiple
equilibria since we plan discrete high-level actions. Their
results indicate that inferring human preference in combination
with finding Nash equilibrium improves prediction and helps
achieve coordination with humans.
Coordination. The importance of coordinating with a
human in non-competitive games was highlighted by Carroll
et al. [2] where they learn human models and used them to
train reinforcement learning agents that achieve performance
superior to self-play. Similar to us, Ho et al. [10] proposed
using social norms for improving coordination in multi-agent
environments. While our approach does not use learning, it can
be incorporated into our framework to replace the user-defined
costs or norms.
III. INTERACTIVE PLANNING BY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We model the multi-agent interactive planning task as a non-
cooperative game represented as tuple G, G = (P,A, c) [13].
Here, P = {P1, ..., PN} is a finite set of N players, A =
A1 × ... × AN where Ai is the set of actions available to
player i. We refer to the set of concurrent actions, one for
each agent, as an action profile, a, a = (a1, ..., aN ). We define
a cost representing the unfavorability of an action profile for
agent i as ci : A 7→ R and c = (c1, ..., cN ) includes the
mapping for all agents.
In our scenario, each agent p is a robot arm, each action
set Ap is a set of goal-driven trajectories, each trajectory is
a sequence of joint-space positions and velocities sampled
using a planner, and the cost ci(a) encourages each robot to
minimize task completion time while avoiding collisions with
other agents. The goal for an agent i is to take an action
ai ∈ Ai in profile a, which minimizes its cost. However,
its cost depends upon the actions chosen by the other agents
in the profile a. We assume that all agents are rational and
have Theory-of-Mind, i.e., they choose actions to minimize
their own cost and are aware of the states and goals of the
other agents. These assumptions allow us to utilize the Nash
Equilibrium (NE) solution concept for this game. An action
profile is a NE, for a single-stage game, if no agent has an
incentive to choose a different action for themselves given that
all the other actions are fixed.
a*
i
∈ argmin
ai
ci(a*
1
, ., ai, ., a*
N
) ∀i ∈ N. (1)
Although generally, only one (mixed) equilibrium is guar-
anteed to exist for a game [13], in our problem, one pure equi-
librium is always present and we find that multiple equilibria
are frequently present. For the planning agent, some of these
equilibria can be eliminated for being Pareto-sub-optimal, i.e.,
worse for all agents. For example, Nash profile, a*1 Pareto-
dominates a profile a*2, if ci(a*
1
) < ci(a*
2
)∀i ∈ N . Next,
we present an approach that can help the agent select an action
by choosing between Pareto-optimal equilibria.
IV. OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
Our strategy chooses between equilibria using two aspects
of human social behavior, norm-following and personality-
adaptation. We model the distribution over equilibria as a prod-
uct of its probability under the norm, pn and its probability
given the predisposed personality, pα,
p(a) = pn(a)pα(a). (2)
Here, and in the rest of this section, a refers to a NE action
profile. Next, we explain the norm for this problem and how
we use observations to update the personality distribution.
A. Norm
Similar to [10], we define a norm to be a set of, situation-
dependent, abstract, instructions that agents follow with the
expectation that others will follow them as well. They help
agents coordinate in the absence of prior knowledge of the
agents they are interacting with. For example, a first-come-
first-leave norm can help decide how cars navigate a four-
way stop. Here, we model it as a probability distribution over
NE. Different games will have different norms and the choice
of a norm should be based on expert knowledge or learned
from data. For our problem, we use a simple min-norm, that
prioritizes the equilibrium which achieves minimum cost for
any of the agents,
pn(a) ∝ e−λnmini(ci(a)), (3)
where λn is a parameter of the exponential distribution that
we set. This norm it encourages the agent with the shortest
unobstructed path to its goal to act first.
B. Online preference estimation
Although norms can help in coordination, people sometimes
have strong preferences that guide them towards certain equi-
libria regardless of the norms. For example, an aggressive
driver may decide to cross an intersection first, despite the
norm, expecting the other drivers to adapt their strategy. We
model this as a distribution over equilibria, inferred at time t
using the history Ht of the past interaction,
ptα(a) = p(a|Ht). (4)
Here, Ht refers to the history of the interaction, i.e., Ht =
{({s0i∈N}), ..., ({st−1i∈N})}, and sti is the state of agent i at time
t. We set it to the uniform distribution at the start,
pt=0α (a) = uniform(a) ∀a. (5)
We define an exponential distribution on the distance be-
tween a past trajectory, H , to an action profile, a,
p(a|H) ∝ e−λαfdist(a,H), (6)
where fdist(a,H) is defined as the euclidean distance
between the sequence of states in H to those sampled at the
same time increments from a and λα is a parameter of the
exponential distribution. Although, we would like to use Eq. 6
to compute p(at|Ht), however, the distance of past trajectories
to current action profiles is not meaningful because the last
state, st, in the history is the first state of all action profiles at
time t. So, we only use Eq. 6 to find p(a0|Ht) and define a
latent variable θ to help infer p(at|Ht). We use θ to represent
a personality-based distribution over equilibria, p(at|θ), and
assume that it remains constant for every agent during an
interaction. We derive p(at|Ht) by using the personality, θ,
p(at|Ht) =
∑
θ
p(at, θ|Ht),
p(at|Ht) =
∑
θ
p(θ|Ht)p(at|θ,Ht).
We assume that the personality, θ, encodes the information
required for predicting the agent’s next action, which makes
at conditionally independent of Ht given θ. So,
p(at|Ht) =
∑
θ
p(θ|Ht)p(at|θ). (7)
We define θ such that each action profile a that belongs to
a personality is equally likely to be chosen,
p(a|θ) = 1θ(a)∑
a′ 1θ(a
′)
. (8)
Next, we find p(θ|Ht) by taking its joint distribution with
a0 and marginalizing it out,
p(θ|Ht) =
∑
a0
p(θ, a0|Ht),
p(θ|Ht) =
∑
a0
p(a0|Ht)p(θ|a0, Ht).
From the conditional independence between θ and Ht given
a0, we get,
p(θ|Ht) =
∑
a0
p(a0|Ht)p(θ|a0). (9)
Since we assume a uniform prior on θ, p(θ) is a constant.
Combining with Eq. 8, we get,
p(θ|a0) = p(θ)p(a
0|θ)
p(θ)
∑
θ′ p(a
0|θ′) =
p(a0|θ)∑
θ′ p(a
0|θ′) (10)
We use p(θ|a0) and p(a0|Ht) (Eq. 6) to get p(θ|Ht) in Eq.
9. This allows us to find p(at|Ht) from Eq. 9 by using p(at|θ)
from Eq. 8, which gives us pα(at) in Eq. 4
V. PICK-PLACE TASK
The pick-and-place task involves two 2-dof articulated arms
moving on a 2D surface with the goal to pick up their
designated object, by moving their end-effector close to it for
grasping, and placing it, by bringing the grasped object to the
destination area. The scenario is depicted in Figure 2, where
the arm with a red base was controlled by our approach, and
the other one was either simulated as a human or controlled
by a human. Henceforth, the former will be referred to as the
robot and the latter as the human.
Fig. 2. Pick-and-place task scenario.
A. Action Planning
To plan for this task, we first sample k − 1 plans for
each agent in configuration space using a Rapidly-exploring
Random Tree (RRT) [12] and add a static plan where the
agent does not move, Ai = {τj∈k}. We use them to generate
an action set by taking the outer product of the trajectories
for each agent, A = A1 × ... × AN . We compute a cost for
each action profile by simulating it and use Eq. 1 to find the
Nash equilibria. We choose the NE profile a that maximizes
the distribution p(a) from Eq. 2, and select the agent’s action
from a. This action, along with the action taken by the human,
is executed until a collision is detected or if the time before
replanning is reached. After this, we update the history Ht
and replan. This process continues until the robot completes
the task and is depicted in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Framework. We first plan trajectories, then use the cost to compute
all Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria, then combine the norm and inferred-
personality distributions to select the most likely equilibrium. This action is
partially executed before repeating the whole process until the task completes.
B. Task Costs
We define a simple cost function that encourages the robot
to complete the task quickly and avoid collisions. The cost of
an action profile, a = (aR, aH), where aR, aH , are the robot
and human actions respectively, is the trajectory duration if it
is successful in reaching the goal and infinity if it leads to a
collision. We sample goal-reaching trajectories for each agent
that are independent of the goal and state of other agents.
We assume that the human is also goal-driven and collision-
avoidant and so assume an analogous cost function where their
cost depends on the human task completion time. Under these
conditions, one pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed as long
as there exists a trajectory for the robot to reach the goal. For
instance, say that we select an action profile with the robot’s
action being the shortest trajectory to its goal and the human’s
action as the shortest trajectory that does not collide with the
robot’s plan (including the static action). This profile will be
a Nash equilibrium since neither agent has an incentive to
modify their actions. For the robot, the action is optimal, and,
for the human, this action is optimal assuming the robot’s
action as fixed due to the infinite cost of a collision.
C. Baselines
We define three baselines to compare with our approach.
1) Defensive. The robot chooses an action assuming that
the human wants to maximize the robot’s cost while
still achieving its goal leading to a maximin formulation.
Thus, the agent will act defensively by preferring actions
that do not lead to collision with the sampled human
trajectories and will often lead it to wait for the human
to complete their task.
aR = argmin
aR∈AR
maxaH∈AH cR(aR, aH). (11)
2) Selfish. Chooses an equilibrium profile that minimizes
the robot’s cost. This strategy selects a trajectory that
reaches the goal as quickly as possible assuming the
other agent avoids collision.
aR ∈ a*, a* = argmin
a*
cR(a*). (12)
3) Norm-Nash. Chooses an equilibrium profile that maxi-
mizes the norm distribution pn from Eq. 3. This leads
to behavior that encourages the agent closer to their
goal to reach them first. While the first two will lead to
somewhat fixed behaviors, this strategy adapts to goal-
achievability, which varies across tasks and also in state
evolution within the same interaction.
aR ∈ a*, a* = argmax
a*
pn(a*). (13)
D. Implementation Details
A 3D simulation environment was created using the
open-source Open Robotics Automation Virtual Environment
(OpenRAVE) [4] with a time step of 0.1 seconds. The action-
set, Ai was sampled using an RRT planner from the open-
source Open Motion Planning Library (OMPL) [25]. We
sampled k = 8 plans for each agent when planning and
compute the cost as an k × k table by simulating the actions
using OpenRAVE with a time-step of 0.8; we increased the
time-step here to allow for fast computation of the nash
solutions. Parameter λn of the norm distribution (Eq. 3) was
set to 50. We set two personality types and use a binary latent
variable θ = {0, 1}. θ = 0 selects equilibrium profiles a that
favor agent 1, c1(a) < c2(a), and θ = 1 selects equilibrium
profiles a that favor agent 2, c2(a) < c1(a). We set λα = 10
in the personality distribution (Eq. 6).
VI. SIMULATED HUMAN STUDY
We simulate human behavior to create a controlled setting
for our first experiment.
A. Simulated Human
We defined three human behaviors using the baselines:
(1) Defensive, (2) Selfish-Nash, and (3) Norm-Nash. We
chose the first two behaviors because of their clear intuitive
distinctness and combine it with the third in accordance with
our expectation that people also follow social norms.
B. Metrics
We measured the following task performance metrics: total
task completion time and task time for each agent; we also
counted safety stops, which are the number of times the
simulation stopped the agents to avoid an impending collision.
To keep these measures independent, we did not have any time
penalty for a safety stop.
Fig. 4. Results from the experiment involving a simulated human. Note
that our proposed approach, Bayes-Nash, is safer than all the non-defensive
baselines and similar in task completion time to the Selfish-Nash baseline.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM).
C. Results
To test how each algorithm fares with the different behav-
iors, we randomly pair the robot with one of these simulated
human behaviors with random object locations for 30 trials.
The averaged metrics for the three baselines and our proposed
approach, Bayes-Nash, are presented in Figure 4. As expected,
the Defensive robot was the safest, but its safe behavior also
caused the highest robot and total task completion times. The
Selfish-Nash was significantly faster than the Defensive robot
but also led to the highest safety stops. Both Norm-Nash and
Bayes-Nash performed comparably in time to Selfish-Nash
but the Bayes-Nash was marginally faster. They were both
significantly safer than Selfish-Nash and Bayes-Nash also had
the fewest safety stops of the two.
D. Analysis
These results illustrate the trade-off between safety and
efficiency present in the task, where the Defensive and Selfish-
Nash agents sit at opposite extremes. Norm-Nash and Bayes-
Nash are able to better trade-off these metrics due to their
capability to adapt to the situation and the (simulated) human,
respectively. Next, we perform an experiment to validate this
trade-off in human interaction.
VII. HUMAN-HUMAN STUDY
To investigate the natural interaction between two people,
we recruited 4 participants to perform the same task, in a pilot
experiment, where both interacting agents were human and
controlled the simulated robot arm using a gamepad controller.
A. Experiment Design
We kept one of the human agents fixed throughout the
experiment and will refer to them as control. The other agent
(participant) evoked different behaviors in each experiment
and performed 3 trials with the control. In the first trial,
the participant was asked to behave naturally, by trying to
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total-Time Control-Time Participant-Time Safety-Stops
Natural Human
Defensive
Selfish
(a) Natural (Control) Human
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Total-Time Robot-Time Human-Time Safety-Stops
Bayes-Nash
Defensive
Selfish-Nash
(b) Bayes-Nash
Fig. 5. (a) Plots the interaction task metrics for the naturally acting human in
the presence of either a selfish or defensive participant in the human-human
study; (b) The same metrics but for the interaction of Bayes-Nash with the
Selfish and Defensive baselines. The similarity in the relative trends across (a)
and (b) highlight the similarity of Bayes-Nash to a real human agent. Error
bars represent SEM.
increase efficiency while reducing task time. For the other
two trials, the participant chose either (1) Selfish - completing
this task efficiently or (2) Defensive - avoiding collisions with
the other arm strategy. The control kept the same natural
strategy throughout the interactions and was not made aware
of the strategy that the participant was employing. Also, no
verbal communication was allowed during the experiment.
We measured the same metrics as in the simulated human
experiment.
B. Results
Figure 5 (a) shows that the total task completion times for
the Selfish and Defensive humans are similar when interacting
with a naturally-acting human. However, in terms of their
individual task completion times, the Defensive agent takes
significantly longer as compared to the Selfish agent. The
Selfish human also triggers more safety stops but the safety
stops in this study were much less than in simulation. In
Figure 5 (b) we show the simulated Defensive and Selfish-
Nash behaviors when interacting with Bayes-Nash. We find
similar comparative trends between behavior types for both
task completion times and safety stops. However, the robot in
(b) completes the task more quickly since the arm is allowed
higher velocities in simulation.
C. Analysis
These results indicate that a naturally-acting human adapts
well to both Selfish and Defensive behavior due to similar task
metrics for both conditions, as shown in Figure 5(a). Similar
trends for Bayes-Nash, Figure 5(b), indicate that it also adapts
well to different strategies. The similarity between trends
Fig. 6. A user controlling the robot arm during the Human-Robot study.
among personalities across experiments validate our interactive
task design and metrics to benchmark performance for parallel
play. Also, since the latent variable used to parameterize the
equilibrium was designed to capture the agent’s favorability in
equilibria and not the specific behaviors of the baselines, we
expect that Bayes-Nash to be able to adapt well to real human
participants. This leads to the following two hypotheses for a
human-robot interaction study:
H1: A robot using Bayes-Nash will have significantly fewer
collisions than a robot using a Selfish-Nash planner.
H2: A robot using Bayes-Nash will have faster task
completion time than a robot using a Defensive planner.
VIII. HUMAN-ROBOT STUDY
We test these hypotheses in a pilot experiment by pairing
human participants with a robot controlled by our algorithm
and the baselines.
A. Experimental Design
In order to validate the proposed approach, we design a
within-subject human study. We examined the effects of three
planning algorithms on their interaction with a human user and
counter-balanced their order. Participants were asked to control
a robot arm in simulation using a gamepad controller, as shown
in Figure 6. The gamepad controller allows users to move
the robot arm in eight different directions at 10 Hz. We used
the same manipulation task as the previous two experiments,
including keeping the object locations the same. Participants
were informed that they might interact with different robots
but not what these types were. There were three rounds of
the task and each round involved six trials. In each round, the
robot used one of the following conditions: (1) Defensive, (2)
Selfish-Nash, and (3) Bayes-Nash. We used the same metrics
as before.
B. Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants went through an
overview of the experimental procedures. The study started
with a pre-survey to collect demographic information. Then
Fig. 7. Human-Robot Study. Defensive and Selfish are baselines, Bayes-
Nash is our approach and the Natural agent refers to the human-human study
results where the participants acted naturally. Error bars represent SEM.
participants entered a practice session to familiarize them-
selves with the user interface and the gamepad controller. The
purpose of this session was to erase potential novelty effects
caused by the robot and the user interface. The practice round
ended when the participants indicated they felt comfortable
with the control and overall task. Then the participants went
through three rounds of pick-and-place tasks with the robot.
Each round consisted of 6 trials and participants were asked
to fill out a short survey after the last trial. After these three
rounds, the participants were given a post-survey with open-
ended questions about their experience.
C. Results
A total of 6 participants were recruited from a university
campus and were randomly assigned to one possible com-
bination of the experimental conditions. Figure 7 compares
the performance of the three agents. We also compare them
to a naturally acting human by including the results of two
naturally acting humans from the human-human study. The
total task completion time was the longest for the Defensive
robot while the other three agents were similar but significantly
faster confirming hypothesis H2. The Defensive robot also
had the longest robot task execution time but also led to the
shortest time for the human. Bayes-Nash was the least safe
and Natural the most, the selfish and defensive conditions had
similarly small safety stops, contrary to hypothesis H1.
D. Analysis
It took the Defensive agent 36.2% more time to complete
the entire task than the Selfish agent. These results confirm
that the Defensive agent acts in an overly cautious manner.
When comparing with the naturally-acting human we also
noticed that the task completion time for the Bayes-Nash
approach performs almost equally well. However, the safety
stops results are surprising in two respects: (1) the higher
number of safety stops for Bayes-Nash as compared to Natural
and other conditions, (2) the much fewer safety stops for all
conditions when compared to the simulated human study. We
also noticed the latter in the human-human study, indicating
Fig. 8. Effect of experience in the Human-Robot study. It shows the
cumulative safety stops for the robot averaged over the trials. For the
Defensive and Selfish-Nash conditions, the number of stops decreases with
more trials, indicating that the human learns to avoid collision. However, for
Bayes-Nash, the safety stops first increase and then remain constant, perhaps
due to the difficulty in adapting to an agent whose behavior is not fixed.
that people are better at avoiding collisions as compared to
the robots. We explore potential causes for these findings in
the next section.
IX. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Figure 5 shows that the Bayes-Nash approach and the
naturally-acting human are similar in their ability to adapt
effectively to different personalities. However, in the human-
robot study, Bayes-Nash had the most safety stops which con-
tradicts H1. We believe there are two potential explanations.
First, due to human learning effects. Fig. 8 shows that the
number of safety stops decrease with more trials for both
the Defensive and Selfish-Nash conditions. This indicates that
the user might have learned a collision-avoidant response to
those agents over time. As for the Bayes-Nash condition, the
safety stops first increase over trials and then remain constant.
This might be because those two strategies had a somewhat
fixed behavior that the human could easily adapt to. For
example, if the robot moves to the goal without consideration
of the human’s presence every time, the human will learn
that her optimal response is to wait for the robot initially.
This is similar to the observation from [23] where the robot
directly influenced human behavior. Although this led to better
performance, in our scenario, it is questionable whether this
fixed behavior will be desirable from a robot collaborator in
the real-world. Second, due to the mismatch in human-robot
speed. Although the maximum arm velocities were the same
for both agents, the robot was able to act faster than the human.
In the Selfish condition, after a couple of trials, people might
have realized that it was easier to complete the task by waiting
for the robot. We need further experiments that control for
these variables to confirm these and plan for it in future work.
Although our approach can generalize to more agents, it
was specifically designed for addressing scenarios involving
human-robot cohabitation where usually only two agents are
present [17, 7]. The time complexity of our algorithm is
exponential in the number of agents, so can become intractable
for large numbers of them. However, this may not be a
limitation in real-world scenarios, since, even in cases where
many agents are present (e.g., driving on a highway), we only
need to consider the interactive influence of a few close-by
cars to generate human-like behavior [24]. In the future we
would like to test it in the presence of more agents.
The primary contribution of our work is in developing
a novel game-theoretic approach for HRI tasks. We also
instituted a pilot study to validate this methodology and
present descriptive statistics of the results. However, the small
sample size did not allow us to run significance tests for the
human experiments. Our plans for future work include a larger
HRI study to provide evidence for generalization to a broad
population.
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